

A XII 1/106

A. XII. 1/106

9 pages wampy stron

A XII 1/106

A. XII. 1/106

SZEF GABINETU NACZELNEGO WODZA

L. dz.

140

/GNW/45.T.1.

MSZ
TAJNE
do wiadomości
20/3.45
WB
PAN MINISTER SPRAW ZAGRANICZNYCH

w miejscu

p. Minister
p. S. G. 26/III
p. Z. S. G.

PIV

Panu Ministrowi przesyłam do wiadomości odpis memorandum złożonego w dniu dzisiejszym Feldmarszałkowi Sir Alan BROOKE, Szefowi Sztabu Imperialnego przez p. c. Naczelnego Wodza.

zał. 1

SZEF GABINETU NACZELNEGO WODZA

Bohuszewicz
BOHUSZEWICZ
Plk. dypl. obs.

z prosbą o omówienie

26/III

A. XII 1 / 106

TOP SECRET

2

THE FUTURE OF THE POLISH ARMED FORCES AT THE SIDE OF GREAT BRITAIN

1. The Intention of the Polish Armed Forces is to fight the Germans, as the interest of Poland demands, and to remain at the side of Great Britain until the end of the present world war. Should Poland at that time not be a free and sovereign country and the Polish people be unable to live in that country according to their own will, the Polish Armed Forces now fighting at the side of Great Britain will be unable or unwilling to return to their home country. The necessity will then arise of furnishing the Polish fighting men with work and such settlements as may ensure their freedom and the conservation of their language, traditions and culture.
2. The Polish High Command visualises that the first difficult situation will arise at the time of the recognition of a new provisional government in Poland by Great Britain, the U.S.A. and the U.S.S.R., with the Polish Armed Forces faithful to their oath of allegiance. Should that government be unconstitutional and should it not obtain recognition from the President of the Republic, Polish soldiers, sailors and airmen would also be unable to recognise it.
3. The Polish High Command would like to draw attention to the fact that when the three Great Powers do recognise the new government, that government and the High Command in Poland will wish to interfere in every matter affecting the life of our Armed Forces. The delegates of the new government will wish to take over not only the protection of the Polish population but also that of the families of the soldiers, sailors and airmen, disabled ex-service-men, schools and a number of other educational and social military institutions existing in territories controlled by Great Britain.

Such interference on the part of the new provisional government might under-

A.XII.1/106

- 2 -

3

the morale in the Services and bring about a state of chaos, in addition to other unforeseen consequences.

4. The Polish High Command is unaware of the solution envisaged by the British authorities to such a difficult problem. They would greatly appreciate a speedy decision in this matter, as theoretically it can be reckoned that a new government may be soon constituted in Poland.

The Polish High Command believes that the Armed Forces should be kept completely independent of such a new government in Poland; the more so as the clarification of such a government's position and that of Russia's attitude to Poland could only take place after the termination of the war against Germany and after the election which are to take place. Assurances were given in the House of Commons during the recent debate that while the war was on help would be given to anyone who could kill Germans and that when the war was over His Majesty's Government would look to the solution of a free, unfettered, democratic election. It seems, therefore, the Polish Armed Forces should be helped to keep their oath allegiance and their obligations as allies, if only because they were fighting Germans. They are still fighting them and are determined to do so till the end.

5. The Prime Minister stated, in the recent debate on the Crimea Conference, that, after the termination of hostilities against Germany, the Government were resolved that as many as possible of the Polish troops should be enabled to return in due course to Poland of their own free will and under every safeguard.

Our attitude in the question of submission to a new government is governed by the military oath of allegiance and depends upon whether Poland will be really free, sovereign and independent. That is why, if the two aforementioned conditions fail to materialise, we wish to, and must, remain at the side

A. XII. 1 / 106

- 3 -

4

of Great Britain after the end of the war against Germany until the general peace. In such a case, we visualise the employment of our armed forces in the occupation of Germany, as part of the Anglo-American Forces. This was mentioned by Mr. Churchill to General Anders in their conversation before the parliamentary debate on the Crimea Conference.

6. It would seem that the problem arising from the difficult position of the Polish cause and the Polish Armed Forces are so numerous that the elaboration of them by experts appointed by the British authorities and the Polish General Staff should begin with the least possible delay.

7. The question of the further development of the Polish Armed Forces and the replacement of casualties is linked with our intention to continue to fight and to remain at the side of Great Britain. This question is closely connected with the morale of our fighting men. These latter, seeing that not only are the Polish Armed Forces able to replace their casualties but are also creating new units, will gain confidence in the goodwill of their Allies towards the Polish cause.

It is still considered that reserves in manpower /complements/ should be drawn from the Polish POWs from the German Army, from prisoners in German camps, and from displaced Poles to be found on German territory to the west of the limit of the Russian zone of occupation in Germany. This is in accordance with the Anglo-Polish Military Agreement of the 5th August, 1940.

8. It should be emphasised that the Polish High Command has not relinquished the idea of uniting the whole of the Polish land forces in one operational theatre on the Western Front as soon as favourable conditions prevail. This would lead to the second phase : their employment in the occupation of Germany. /This was

mentioned to General Anders by Mr. Churchill/.

9. Finally, there is the question of continuing payments to the dependents of service-men, widows and orphans of those killed in action, to schools in territories controlled by Great Britain, as well as the possibility of maintaining liaison with Poland. All of these points will have a great influence on the morale of the Polish Armed Forces.

More difficult, but extremely important from the human point of view, will be to endeavour by all possible means to protect against persecution those families of our fighting men at present in Poland or other countries not under British or American control, and to facilitate their transfer to the place of residence of our Service-men, should these latter be unable or unwilling to return to Poland after the war. A fact which must be taken into account is that many soldiers, sailors and airmen have not seen their wives and children for over five years and, even worse, are not able to correspond with them.

London,
March 9th, 1945.

A.XII.1/106

TOP SECRET

6

THE FUTURE OF THE POLISH ARMED FORCES AT THE SIDE OF GREAT BRITAIN

1. The intention of the Polish Armed Forces is to fight the Germans, as the interest of Poland demands, and to remain at the side of Great Britain until the end of the present world war. Should Poland at that time not be a free and sovereign country and the Polish people be unable to live in that country according to their own will, the Polish Armed Forces now fighting at the side of Great Britain will be unable or unwilling to return to their home country. The necessity will then arise of furnishing the Polish fighting men with work and such settlements as may ensure their freedom and the conservation of their language, traditions and culture.

2. The Polish High Command visualises that the first difficult situation will arise at the time of the recognition of a new provisional government in Poland by Great Britain, the U.S.A. and the U.S.S.R., with the Polish Armed Forces faithful to their oath of allegiance. Should that government be unconstitutional and should it not obtain recognition from the President of the Republic, Polish soldiers, sailors and airmen would also be unable to recognise it.

3. The Polish High Command would like to draw attention to the fact that when the three Great Powers do recognise the new government, that government and the High Command in Poland will wish to interfere in every matter affecting the life of our Armed Forces. The delegates of the new government will wish to take over not only the protection of the Polish population but also that of the families of the soldiers, sailors and airmen, disabled exservice-men, schools and another of other educational and social military institutions

/ existing

A.XII.1/106

7

existing in territories controlled by Great Britain.

Such interference on the part of the new provisional government might undermine the morale in the Services and bring about a state of chaos, in addition to other unforeseen consequences.

4. The Polish High Command is unaware of the solution envisaged by the British authorities to such a difficult problem. They would greatly appreciate a speedy decision in this matter, as theoretically it can be reckoned that a new government may be soon constituted in Poland.

The Polish High Command believes that the Armed Forces should be kept completely independent of such a new government in Poland; the more so as the clarification of such a government's position and that of Russia's attitude to Poland could only take place after the termination of the war against Germany and after the elections which are then to take place. Assurances were given in the House of Commons during the recent debate that while the war was on help would be given to anyone who could kill Germans and that when the war was over His Majesty's Government would look to the solution of a free, unfettered, democratic election. It seems, therefore, the Polish Armed Forces should be helped to keep their oath of allegiance and their obligations as allies, if only because they were fighting Germans. They are still fighting them and are determined to do so till the end.

5. The Prime Minister stated, in the recent debate on the Crimea Conference, that, after the termination of hostilities against Germany, the Government were resolved that as many as possible of the Polish troops should be enabled to return in due course to Poland of their own free will and under every safeguard.

/ Our attitude ...

A. XII. 1/106

- 2 -

8

Our attitude in the question of submission to a new government is governed by the military oath of allegiance and depends upon whether Poland will be really free, sovereign and independent. That is why, if the two afore-mentioned conditions fail to materialise, we wish to, and must, remain at the side of Great Britain after the end of the war against Germany until the general peace. In such a case, we visualise the employment of our armed forces in the occupation of Germany, as part of the Anglo-American Forces. This was mentioned by Mr. Churchill to General Anders in their conversation before the parliamentary debate on the Crimea Conference.

6. It would seem that the problem arising from the difficult position of the Polish cause and the Polish Armed Forces are so numerous that the elaboration of them by experts appointed by the British authorities and the Polish General Staff should begin with the least possible delay.

7. The question of the further development of the Polish Armed Forces and the replacement of casualties is linked with our intention to continue to fight and to remain at the side of Great Britain. This question is closely connected with the morale of our fighting men. These latter, seeing that not only are the Polish Armed Forces able to replace their casualties but are also creating new units, will gain confidence in the goodwill of their Allies towards the Polish cause.

It is still considered that reserves in manpower (complements) should be drawn from the Polish POWs from the German Army, from prisoners in German camps, and from displaced Poles to be found on German territory to the west of the limit of the Russian zone of occupation in Germany. This is in accordance with the Anglo-Polish Military Agreement of the 5th August, 1940.

/ 8.

A. XII. 1/106

9

8. It should be emphasized that the Polish High Command has not relinquished the idea of uniting the whole of the Polish land forces in one operational theatre, on the Western Front as soon as favourable conditions prevail. This would lead to the second phase: their employment in the occupation of Germany. (This was mentioned to General Anders by Mr. Churchill).

9. Finally, there is the question of continuing payments to the dependents of service-men, widows and orphans of those killed in action, to schools in territories controlled by Great Britain, as well as the possibility of maintaining liaison with Poland. All of these points will have a great influence on the morale of the Polish Armed Forces.

More difficult, but extremely important from the human point of view, will be to endeavour by all possible means to protect against persecution those families of our fighting men at present in Poland or other countries not under British or American control, and to facilitate their transfer to the place of residence of our Service-men, should these latter be unable or unwilling to return to Poland after the war. A fact which must be taken into account is that many soldiers, sailors and airmen have not seen their wives and children for over five years and, even worse, are not able to correspond with them.

London,
9th March 1945.